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Constitutionalizing Ethics
By Bennett Gershman*
I. Introduction
On November 7, 2017, as they are mandated to do every
twenty years, New Yorkers will vote on the following question:
“Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution and
amend the same?”1 The last convention was held fifty years ago:
a revised constitution was presented to the voters, and its
recommendations were decisively rejected.2 The battle lines this
year have hardened, and diverse interest groups have coalesced
to support and oppose a convention.3 Whether the voters will
recommend a convention, elect delegates to the convention the
following year, and ultimately approve a new constitution the
year after that, is anybody’s guess.
New York’s present constitution—approved in 1938—is its
sixth constitution.4 It’s a lengthy document containing some
fifty thousand words, more than six times the length of the
United States Constitution.
It contains twenty articles
compared to the federal Constitution’s six. It has been amended
two hundred times.5
Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. I would
like to thank the Pace Law Review for organizing the symposium on the New
York State Constitution and inviting me to participate. This article was
adapted from the author’s remarks delivered on March 24, 2017 at The New
York State Constitution, a symposium of PACE LAW REVIEW, held at Elisabeth
Haub School of Law at Pace University.
1. 2017 Proposed Constitutional Amendments, N.Y. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.ny.gov/ProposedAmendments.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2017).
2. See Brian M. Kolb, New York’s Last, Best Hope for Real Reform: The
Case for Convening a State Constitutional Convention, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
601, 603 (2011).
3. See Lisa W. Foderaro, A Constitutional Convention for New York?
This May Be the Year, NY TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/201
7/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html?mcubz=1.
4. See Jerald A. Sharum, A Brief History of the Mechanisms of
Constitutional Change in New York and the Future Prospects for the Adoption
of the Initiative Power, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1055 (2007).
5. See Kolb, supra note 2, at 603.
*
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A constitution codifies the rules and values that shape a
state’s identity. It is in effect a blueprint or manual for the
operation of government.
It enumerates the powers of
government and the rights of individuals. The conflict over
whether to revise New York’s Constitution is understandable.
Most observers agree that there are many defects in the
constitution—critics have called it a “broken constitution”6—
which they claim has created a crisis in state government.
Among the provisions that need to be amended, critics contend,
are the structure of the judiciary, taxation and funding, the
budgetary process, environmental conservation, administration
of elections, campaign finance, legislative reapportionment, the
relationship between the state and local governments, and many
other issues. By the same token, reasonable arguments have
been advanced by groups seeking to preserve the status quo,
such as labor unions, abortion rights groups, environmentalists,
and gun advocates who seek risks in a wholesale revision of the
constitution rather than through the familiar process of
piecemeal amendment. Oppositionists also point to the huge
cost to taxpayers in the multi-year revision process.7
Nevertheless, the relentless criticism of New York’s
government by good government groups for its dysfunction,
inefficiency, and “culture of corruption”8 may be the most potent
impetus for energizing voters to seek constitutional change.
The purpose of this essay is not to weigh in the wisdom or
utility in revising New York’s Constitution. However, in my
opinion, one of the most compelling reasons to amend New
York’s Constitution is the need to incorporate into the
fundamental charter a meaningful code of ethics, including
6. See PETER J. GALIE, CHRISTOPHER BOPST & GERALD BENJAMIN, NEW
YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH TO
RENEWED GREATNESS (2016).
7. See Matthew Hamilton, Report: Few Pros and Many Cons to New York’s
UNION
(June
23,
2016),
Constitutional
Conventions,
TIMES
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-Few-pros-many-cons-to-NewYork-s-8321655.php (noting that 1967 convention cost $47 million, or $336.5
million at today’s cost, if adjusted for inflation).
8. See NY Reform Coalition: Albany Ethics Reform is Inadequate, More
Comprehensive Plan is Still Needed, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT
N.Y.U. (March 31, 2015) [hereinafter NY Reform
Coalition],
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/albany-ethics-reforminadequate-more-comprehensive-plan-still-needed.
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procedures for its enforcement, and sanctions for violations.
New York over the past fifteen years has experienced more
scandals, criminal prosecutions, and convictions of lawmakers
and other government officials for corruption than any state in
the nation.9 It is certainly arguable that the extent of New
York’s corruption, and the widespread cynicism and distrust of
the New York government, may be attributable to the state’s
inability to enact meaningful and enforceable ethics laws. The
public perception appears to be that New York’s government is
not working for them and that some officials subordinate the
good of the state to their own personal gain. It is this crisis in
government ethics that to me offers one of the strongest
arguments for amending the constitution to bring about
meaningful ethics reforms.
Indeed, as of this writing, and despite numerous so-called
“sweeping ethics reforms,”10 the current state of New York ethics
laws is a hodgepodge of marginal, technical, and mostly
insignificant rules that appear to have had only a meager impact
on regulating the conduct of public and political officials. New
York’s ethics rules are insufficiently rigorous, and enforcement
is negligible. Nevertheless, despite repeated calls for many
years for meaningful ethics reform, there have been no
significant changes to the core concerns of good government
groups such as ending conflicts of interest, regulating lobbyists,
requiring disclosure of outside income, reforming pay to play
abuses, and limiting the vast amounts of unregulated money
that flows into campaigns.11 Tweaking and tinkering with
9. See infra notes 66-70, and accompanying text.
10. See Karl J. Sleight & Joan P. Sullivan, Ethics and Lobbying Reform
in
State
Government
(Again),
N.Y.
L.J.
(Dec.
6,
2011),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202534430223/Ethics-and-LobbyingReform-in-State-Government-Again (describing how Public Integrity Reform
Act “overhauled last sweeping reform”); Karl J. Sleight & John A. Mancuso,
Ethics and the Constitution, 12 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 1, 35 (2010) (“collateral
damage of scandal washes over an ethics commission and the commission ends
up being replaced with a new and improved commission.”).
11. See Albany Ethics Reform is Inadequate, More Comprehensive Plan is
Still Needed, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/albany-ethics-reforminadequate-more-comprehensive-plan-still-needed
(describing
“reactive
improvements [that] put nothing more than a dent in the problem of public
corruption and obfuscate the reason our state is experiencing a crime wave of
corruption.”); Rachel Silberstein, Since State of the State, Cuomo Silent on
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Potemkin-like ethics laws—laws that create a façade of serious
ethics oversight—and officials engaging in false bravado to
publicize these “sweeping ethics reform” bills only reinforces the
public’s cynicism over New York’s broken ethics system.
Ethics rules, as discussed below, can be adopted and
enforced in several ways. First, investigations can be launched
into allegations of official and political misconduct and systemic
issues involving fraud, waste, and mismanagement which can
result in recommendations on ways to regulate certain types of
unethical behavior and enhance public trust in government.12
Second, legislation can be enacted to prevent certain types of
unethical behavior by creating substantive rules of ethics,
procedures for investigation and adjudication, and imposition of
penalties for violations.13 Third, criminal prosecutions can be
launched when officials are found to have engaged in deviant
behavior that is not only unethical, but also violates criminal
laws.14 Finally, amendments to the state constitution can be
enacted to address ethics reforms similar to the legislative
approach by adopting substantive rules and procedures for
investigation, adjudication, and punishment.15
II. Investigating Ethics – Moreland Commissions
An important catalyst for ethics reform in New York State
has been the Moreland Act. Enacted in 1907 under the
leadership of progressive Governor Charles Evans Hughes, later
a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Moreland Act has been
employed by virtually every governor to investigate problems of
waste, mismanagement, and corruption at all levels of state

Ethics Reform, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.
com/state/6814-since-state-of-the-state-cuomo-silent-on-ethics-reform
(“[T]here have been various incremental ethics reform measures passed but
they have proved insufficient in preventing corruption in state government.”);
Michael Gormley, Albany Criticized for Lack of Ethics Reform as Session Ends,
NEWSDAY (July 2, 2017), http://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/albanycriticized-for-lack-of-ethics-reform-as-session-ends-1.13778749.
12. See supra notes 15-36, and accompanying text.
13. See supra notes 37-65, and accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 66-72, and accompanying text.
15. See supra notes 73-78, and accompanying text.
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government and recommend reforms.16 The Act authorizes the
governor under the state’s executive law17 to create a
commission to investigate the conduct of departments and
agencies and expose inefficiencies, political self-dealing, and
criminal behavior. Seven commissions were established by
reform Governor William Sulzer, elected in 1912, which exposed
widespread corruption by his own Democratic Party and
recommended electoral reforms.18
The state legislature
retaliated against Sulzer, and ultimately uncovered evidence
that he had violated state campaign finance laws, and
impeached and removed him from office.19
Dozens of Moreland Commissions were appointed
thereafter by reform-minded governors. Alfred E. Smith, elected
governor in 1919, established fourteen Moreland Commissions
and even appointed himself a commissioner twice.20 Smith’s
commissions investigated the state police, private industry, and
public works, which revealed widespread corruption,
inefficiency, and mismanagement.21 Governor Smith is credited
with creating child welfare, workmen’s compensation, labor
laws, and other state reforms.22 Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
elected governor in 1928, authorized a Moreland Commission to
investigate the state’s banking department and recommend
changes in banking laws.23
But of all the many Moreland Commissions impaneled by
governors to investigate public and political mismanagement
and corruption, two commissions stand out.
Corruption
scandals in the mid-1980’s produced a public outcry over
rampant political abuses in state and local government, and
created the perception that illegal and unethical practices were
rife throughout the state. In 1987, Governor Mario Cuomo
16. See Bruce W. Dearstyne, A Century of Moreland, TIMES UNION (Aug.
30, 2014, 4:49 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/A-century-ofMoreland-5724049.php; see also ERNEST HENRY BREUER, MORELAND ACT
INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK: 1907-1965 (1965).
17. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 6, 63(8) (McKinney 2010).
18. See Dearstyne, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Dearstyne, supra note 16.
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created a Moreland Commission on Government Integrity and
directed it to investigate weaknesses in existing laws and
procedures connected with campaign financing, judicial
selection, conflicts of interest, solicitation of government
business, and the use of public and political party positions for
personal enrichment.24 The commission, chaired by John
Feerick, Dean of Fordham University Law School, spent several
years conducting public hearings and issued twenty reports,
including seven reports on the state’s campaign financing
system.25 The commission found that the current campaign
finance laws were so outmoded and inadequate that they
undermined public trust and integrity in government.26 One of
the commission’s singular achievements was a blueprint to
reform the campaign finance system.27
The commission made recommendations on many other
political and ethical issues, including closing loopholes in the
New York Ethics in Government Act, abolishing judicial
elections for full-time trial courts, reforming laws on how
candidates get on the ballot in state primaries, examining
defects in the state’s open meetings law, limiting the influence
of political patronage, and strengthening the whistleblower law
of the state.28
Much more controversial than the 1987 Commission was
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s use of the Moreland Act in 2013 to
create a commission to investigate public corruption.29 The
commission was unprecedented. In partnership with the state
attorney general, it possessed the most extensive investigative
powers of any previous commission in the state’s history. The
commission had broad power to investigate any matter that

24. See New York State Commission on Government Integrity, Restoring
the Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
173, 174 (1990).
25. See John D. Feerick, Reflections on Chairing the New York State
Commission on Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 160 (1990).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 160-61.
29. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 106 (July 2, 2013); Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo
Creates Special Commission to Investigate Corrupt Elected Officials, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/nyregion/cuomonames-panel-to-investigate-corrupt-elected-officials.html.
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involved “public peace, safety, and justice.”30 Thus, if the
commission’s investigation revealed violations within the
attorney general’s jurisdiction, such as misuse of taxpayer
money by pension padding, no-show jobs, abuse of legislative
earmarks, and fraud at the secretive public authorities, the
commission through its deputy attorney generals—ten of whom
were sitting district attorneys —could empanel grand juries to
prosecute these cases.31
Given its broad mandate and
prosecutorial experience, it was believed that the commission
would likely uncover criminal violations and prosecute them.
However, the results from these two high-profile Moreland
Commissions are disheartening.
The 1987 Moreland
Commission’s final report lamented that the laws of New York
fall woefully short in guarding against political abuses in an
alarming number of areas and that New York has not
demonstrated a real commitment to government ethics
reforms.32 The report urged the leaders of the state to act before
new scandals erupted and to ensure that government ethics
attain a meaningful role in the conduct of all state officials.
Virtually none of the commission’s recommendations were
enacted into law.33
The 2013 Moreland Commission suffered an even more
dispiriting demise. The high expectations for an aggressive
investigation into public corruption, which included focusing not
only on outright criminal behavior such as bribery and fraud,
but also widespread unsavory but legitimate conduct such as
exploiting loopholes to bundle huge campaign contributions or
receive so-called “lulus,”34 or extra payments in lieu of expenses,
were quickly dashed. The commission was hampered by
infighting, arguments, and accusations, its independence was
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Feerick, supra note 25, at 161.
33. Id.
34. See Jon Campbell, Legal or Fraud? NY Senate Defends Payment
Tactic, THE JOURNAL NEWS (May 15, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.lohud.com/
story/news/politics/politics-on-the-hudson/2017/05/15/legal-fraud-ny-senatedefends-payment-tactic/101711118/ (describing how eight New York state
senators were paid thousands of dollars in stipends for committee positions
they did not actually hold, a tactic known as “lulus,” or payments in lieu of
expenses).
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compromised, and its investigations undermined by pressure
from the governor’s office.35 The governor abruptly disbanded
the commission halfway through what he initially announced
would be an eighteen-month life.36
III. Legislating Ethics
Calls for ethics reform through legislation has been a
constant theme in newspaper editorials and platforms of
governors, legislative leaders, and others for the past seventyfive years, especially in response to the public’s reaction to
repeated corruption scandals and other ethical misconduct.37
Dozens of bills have been introduced in Albany to address a
cornucopia of ethics abuses, mostly involving conflicts of
interest, campaign finance, disclosure, pay to play, lobbying
abuses, and gifts. In 1954, after widespread allegations of
unethical conduct by public and political officials in the harness
racing industry, and in response to conclusions of the Special
Legislative Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in
Government, New York enacted the first generally applicable
state ethics law in the country.38 At the time, the legislation was
considered a pioneering effort to address abuses by government

35. See Susanne Craig, William K. Rashbaum & Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo’s
Office Hobbled Ethics Inquiries by Moreland Commission, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/governorandrew-cuomo-and-the-short-life-of-the-moreland-commission.html; Bennett
L. Gershman, Is Gov. Cuomo’s Anti-Corruption Commission Going Off
the
Rails?,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
12,
2013,
5:57
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/is-gov-cuomosanticorrupt_b_4262062.html.
36. See Jesse McKinley & Thomas Kaplan, Capitol Corruption Panel’s
Demise Angers Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.c
om/2014/04/01/nyregion/cuomos-push-to-end-moreland-commission-drawsbacklash.html.
37. See COMM. ON ST. AFFAIRS & COMM. ON GOV’T ETHICS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N,
REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS LAWS THE RIGHT WAY 7-8 (2010) [hereinafter
REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS] (“It is little wonder that the New York Times
editorial page described our state capital as ‘a swamp of intrigue and
corruption’ and 2009 as ‘New York’s moment of shame.’”); see also Editorial,
Fed Up With Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/200
9/10/19/opinion/19mon1.html.
38. See Forti v. N.Y. State Ethics Comm’n, 554 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1990).
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officials of their public office for private financial gain.39 The
problem of ethical standards, according to the committee’s
resolution, “involves a whole range of border-line behavior,
questions of propriety, and the question of conflicts of interest.”40
It concluded that “the people are entitled to expect from their
public servants a set of standards above the morals of the
marketplace.”41
Some revisions were made to the 1954 ethics law in
subsequent years, but the law was largely ineffective in curbing
conflicts of interest and influence peddling in Albany.42 Indeed,
following new allegations of conflict of interest abuses ten years
later, the legislature created another special committee which
proposed a new Code of Ethics for legislators.43 The code was
never adopted. Thereafter, as noted above, following a series of
corruption scandals in the mid-1980’s, Governor Mario Cuomo
appointed another commission on government integrity, which
led to the passage of the 1987 Ethics in Government Act.44 The
Act imposed enhanced restrictions on conflicts of interest by
lawmakers, particularly in their ability to represent clients
before government agencies.45 The Act also established new
financial disclosure requirements for state officials, created the
State Ethics Commission, which had jurisdiction over the
executive branch, and created the Legislative Ethics Committee,
which had jurisdiction over the legislative branch.46 The 1987
Act also created a Temporary Commission on Local Government
Ethics which recommended significant reforms, none of which
were adopted.

39. Id. See Patrick J. Dellay, Curbing Influence Peddling in Albany: The
1987 Ethics in Government Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1051 (1988).
40. See Karl J. Sleight & John A. Mancuso, Ethics and the Constitution,
12 N.Y. ST. B.J. 1, 35 (2010).
41. See Patricia Salkin, New York is at the Tipping Point in
Public Confidence in Government, TIMES UNION (June 2, 2009, 10:48 AM),
http://blog.timesunion.com/salkin/ny-is-at-the-tipping-point-in-publicconfidence-in-government/35/.
42. See Forti, 554 N.E.2d at 876; Dellay, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. See Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 73, 1987 N.Y. Sess. Laws
(McKinney).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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In 2007, after twenty years without any comprehensive
change in the state’s ethics laws, the legislature enacted the
Public Employee Ethics Reform Act (“PEERA,”)47 which
purported to be a comprehensive modification of lobbying and
ethics laws. Although enacted without public discussion or
debate, the Act was hailed by Governor Elliot Spitzer as a
“dramatic, significant, fundamental step forward,”48 and by the
New York State Assembly as containing “ground breaking and
sweeping reforms to ensure the highest possible standards by
government officials.”49 The lengthy Act, comprising forty-six
sections, addressed many aspects of government ethics. But
despite the hyperbole, the Act was mostly cosmetic. The Act did
include a ban on honoraria, a reduction in the allowable value of
gifts, prohibitions on nepotism, a ban on lawmakers appearing
in taxpayer-funded advertisements, and increased penalties for
violations. But critical reforms were absent. The Act did not
address core concerns such as campaign finance abuses, conflicts
of interest, outside income, financial disclosure, regulation of
lobbyists, and lack of an independent ethics regulatory agency,
including an independent bipartisan ethics commission with
jurisdiction over all public officials, inclusive of both the
executive and legislative branches. PEERA has been called a
“complete failure.”50 Since its creation, numerous lawmakers
were convicted of bribery, fraud, and other crimes but the
Legislative Ethics Committee issued not a single finding against
a sitting lawmaker.
Three years later, in response to more scandals, Governor
Paterson announced: “sweeping reforms to fundamentally
change the culture of Albany.”51
His proposal included
regulations to reduce campaign contributions, require disclosure
of outside income, strip the pension from any public official
47. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW, §§ 73, 73A, 74 (McKinney 2008); N.Y. CIV.
SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 2011).
48. See REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS, supra note 37, at 7-8.
49. Id.
50. See LAWRENCE NORDEN, KELLY WILLIAMS & JOHN TRAVIS, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U., MEANINGFUL ETHICS REFORM FOR THE “NEW”
ALBANY (2011).
51. See Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Seeks Overhaul to Combat
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/ny
region/05ethics.html.
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convicted of a felony, phase in public financing of campaigns, and
impose term limits on all state officeholders. In response, the
legislature enacted a “comprehensive” ethics reform bill
requiring greater disclosure of outside income for legislators,
greater oversight of lobbyists, and replacing the existing
Commission on Public Integrity with the Ethics Commission, as
well as creating an Ethics Designating Commission to recruit
and attract qualified individuals to serve on the commission.52
The new commission would have jurisdiction over both the
executive and legislative branches and would take over
enforcement of campaign finance laws.53 Although the bill was
termed the “strongest ethics reform bill in a generation,”54 the
governor vetoed the bill, claiming it “falls short” of his call for
independent oversight of the legislature.55
The following year, the legislature enacted another
“sweeping reform,” this time through the Public Integrity
Reform Act of 2011 (“PIRA”).56 The new reforms were hailed as
“dramatic and wide-ranging.”57
They included a unitary
independent ethics agency with jurisdiction over both the
executive
and
legislative
branches,
new
disclosure
requirements, and robust mandatory training for public officials
and lobbyists.58 A centerpiece of the new legislation was the
creation of the Joint Commission on Public Ethics (“JCOPE”)
with the power to investigate both the executive and legislative
branches.59 It was the sixth ethics regulatory agency to exist in
state government over the preceding five years. According to
some experts, JCOPE represented a “sea change” in the
52. Senate Passes Strongest Ethics Reform in a Generation,
N.Y. ST. SENATE (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/senate-passes-strongest-ethics-reform-generation.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Kenneth Lovett, Paterson Vetoes Ethics Reform Bill He Calls
“Deeply Flawed,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Feb. 2, 2010, 11:44 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/gov-paterson-vetoes-ethics-reform-billcalls-deeply-flawed-article-1.193984.
56. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.19, § 938.1 (2011).
57. See Sleight, supra note 10 (describing the new law as “representing a
sea change in the enforcement and regulation of lobbying and ethics ion the
state of New York.”).
58. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.19, § 938.1 (2011).
59. Id.
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enforcement of state ethics laws.60 According to other observers,
it was a “joke,” and amounted to “little more than putting
lipstick on a pig.”61 Moreover, JCOPE’s so-called independence
was disputed; its members are not “independent” but are
appointed by the governor and the legislature. Indeed, JCOPE
played no role with respect to the dozens of lawmakers who were
accused and convicted of corruption since 2011—it did play a role
in removing one lawmaker—Assemblyman Vito Lopez.62
Finally, in 2016, for the seventh year in a row, Governor
Cuomo proposed an ethics reform package that included closing
the loophole that allows limited liability corporations (“LLC’s”)
to spend vast sums on elections, public campaign financing, a
cap on lawmakers’ outside income, and expansion of the
Freedom of Information law to cover legislators.63 The new
Ethics Reform Act of 2016 did not include any of these proposals.
It did include broader financial disclosure requirements that
some critics have derided as over-excessive, but it did not
address any of the above proposals.64 Although the 2017
legislative session ended without addressing any comprehensive
ethics reforms, one ethics measure did get passed. It would
remove pensions from state lawmakers convicted of corruption
crimes.65 The bill will require an amendment to the state
constitution, which will go to the voters in November.
IV. Prosecuting Ethics
Ethics violations and criminal conduct often overlap.
Conflicts of interest and influence-peddling, particularly where

60. See Sleight, supra note 10.
61. See Editorial, New Teeth for New York’s Ethics Watchmouse, N.Y. POST
(Nov. 8, 2015, 7:38 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/08/new-teeth-for-newyorks-ethics-watchmouse/.
62. Id.
63. See Nick Reisman, Cuomo: New Ethics Reform Bill is Just
the Beginning, SPECTRUM NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:00 AM),
http://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/capital-region/politics/2016/08/25/cuomoethics-bill-follow-new-york-state-albany.
64. Id.
65. New York State Legislators Pass Pension Reform Bill, DAILY
MESSENGER (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.mpnnow.com/news/2017013
0/new-york-state-legislators-pass-pension-reform-bill.
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money is used by private interests to buy government favors and
enrich the government official, can be prosecuted as bribery,
extortion, fraud, conspiracy, and official misconduct. Indeed, in
the past fifteen years over forty New York State Legislators have
been accused or convicted of corruption.66 The leaders of the
New York State Assembly and Senate—Sheldon Silver and
Dean Skelos—were convicted of federal corruption crimes for
selling their influence.67 So was the former Senate Majority
Leader Joseph Bruno.68 At least nine officials in the executive
branch, including two persons close to the governor, were
charged with bid-rigging and bribery in an upstate corruption
scandal.69 Interestingly, none of these prosecutions were
instituted by local or state prosecutors—they were initiated by
federal prosecutors. New York State has the highest number of
criminal prosecutions for corruption-related conduct by
government officials of any state in the nation.70
From a prosecutor’s standpoint, good government is about
the rectitude of government officials in serving their
66. Troubled NY Politicians: A List of Arrests, Scandals, Misdeeds, and
Controversies, SYRACUSE.COM | THE POST-STANDARD (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/troubled_ny_politicians_a_li
st_of_arrests_scandals_misdeeds_and_controversies.html.
67. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States,
both convictions were later vacated. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016). The government has announced it plans to retry both cases. See
Benjamin Weiser, Dean Skelos’s 2015 Corruption Conviction is Overturned,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/nyregion/de
an-skelos-2015-corruption-conviction-overturned.html.
68. See Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Bruno, Former State
TIMES
(Dec.
7,
2009),
Leader,
Guilty
of
Corruption,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/nyregion/08bruno.html.
69. See Vivian Yee, Ex-Advisers to Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo Are Indicted in
Federal Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2
016/11/22/nyregion/ex-advisers-to-gov-andrew-m-cuomo-are-indicted-infederal-bribery-case.html.
70. See Alan Greenblatt, Congratulations, New York, You’re #1 in
Corruption, POLITICO (May 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2
015/05/how-new-york-became-most-corrupt-state-in-america-117652;
Dan
Clark, Yes, New York Has More Corrupt Officials Than Any Other State,
POLITIFACT NEW YORK (Sept. 19, 2016, 1:38 PM), http://www.politifact.com/ne
w-york/statements/2016/sep/19/elaine-phillips/new-york-has-been-mostcorrupt-state-decades/; Kirstan Conley, Study Proves NY Politicians
Most Corrupt in Nation, N.Y. POST (Nov. 9, 2015, 12:46 PM),
http://nypost.com/2015/11/09/study-proves-ny-politicians-most-corrupt-innation/.
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constituents. It is about the integrity of our democracy. Using
the criminal law to root out corruption is one of a prosecutor’s
most critical functions. As prosecutors see it, convicting corrupt
public officials goes to the heart of the rule of law and the
preservation of the democratic process. Public corruption
undermines the legitimacy of government and the confidence of
the public that officials are not abusing their trust for personal
gain. Making those officials who abuse their trust criminally
accountable for their misconduct deters other would-be
wrongdoers, which is a paramount consideration by law
enforcement. Thus, as former United States Attorney Preet
Bharara has stated, who was responsible for most of the
prosecutions of corrupt New York lawmakers, “the cure to what
ails our political system calls for hard-nosed investigations,
fearless prosecutions, and savvy watchdogs.”71 Bharara noted
that rule-makers with a self-interest in the status quo “do not
often rush to change rules they themselves made.”72 The only
viable means of ethics enforcement, therefore, may be through
aggressive criminal prosecution.
V. Constitutionalizing Ethics
Amending the state constitution to incorporate new
provisions dealing with the regulation of government ethics may
be the most effective means of reform.73 Several states have
“constitutionalized” their code of ethics,74 and while
constitutional regulation of ethics is unusual and controversial,
it may be one of the most effective checks on ethical misconduct
by government officials. Given New York’s failure to enact and
enforce meaningful ethics reforms, it certainly can be much more
effective than legislative regulation and enforcement.
Moreover, a constitutional structure for ethics regulation would
71. See Preet Bhahara, Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 601, 606 (2015).
72. Id. at 607.
73. See Symposium, Can a NYS Constitutional Convention Strengthen
Government Ethics? ALB. LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 25, 2016); Karl J. Sleight & John
A. Mancuso, Ethics and the Constitution, 12 N.Y. ST. B.J. 35 (2010).
74. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. 3, §§ 7-8; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; HAW. CONST.
art. XIV; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; OKL. CONST. art. 29; TEX. CONST. art. III,
§§ 24-24a.
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be a permanent fixture in state law. It would avoid the cyclical
gamesmanship that has characterized New York State’s history
of ethics reform: government scandal, public outcry, “sweeping
reforms” by the legislature, new scandals, public outcry,
pronouncements that existing laws are insufficiently effective,
and then more new “sweeping reforms.”75 Making ethics
regulation a constitutional fixture would also dramatize not only
the importance of ethics reform, but provide a framework for
promulgating substantive ethics laws, procedures for
investigation and adjudication, and the imposition of penalties
for violations.
Assuming that the voters decide to convene a constitutional
convention and elect delegates to the convention to revise the
constitution, there is good reason to believe that one significant
area that would command interest and support would be ethics
reform. Given the ridicule heaped on New York State for its
parade of scandals, described as a “culture of corruption,”76 and
the resulting public cynicism over the failure of state
government to reform itself, the inclusion in a new constitution
of an ethics code and a regulatory commission for its
enforcement would be a dramatic step towards meaningful
ethics reform and ethics enforcement.
The contours of a constitutionally-based ethics commission
would need to be carefully delineated. There would undoubtedly
be legal challenges that would have to be resolved by the state’s
highest court, the New York Court of Appeals. One important
challenge would be whether a constitutionally-created ethics
commission should be empowered to draft its own substantive
code of ethics, procedures for investigation and adjudication, and
the imposition of penalties for violations.77 The drafting of
substantive legal rules ordinarily is the work of the state
legislature, not a commission. There will very likely be
challenges from both the executive and legislative branches
about the commission’s power to “legislate” in the field of
substantive ethics law, especially if the commission’s rules and
procedures infringe too aggressively on the conduct of these
75. See Sleight, supra note 40, at 37.
76. See NY Reform Coalition, supra note 8.
77. See Samuel D. Zurier, Pruning the Tree: The Supreme Court Clips the
Power of the Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 48 R.I. B.J. 5 (2000).
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officials. Depending on the language used, it might be claimed
that a constitutionally-created ethics commission has been
granted the authority in the field of ethics to draft substantive
rules of ethics and thereby accorded constitutional status equal
to the status of the established three branches of government.78
Another issue would be the composition of the
constitutionally-created ethics commission. Who would have the
power to select its members? Would the governor or the
legislature be authorized to make the selection? Moreover, who
would define the procedures for the commission’s investigations
and prosecutions? Who would be responsible for its budget?
Presumably, all fiscal power in a state lies with the legislative
branch. If that is the case, then the legislature through its
funding power could limit the power of the ethics commission
through its control of the purse. And too, who would be
responsible for defining the penalties for violations, the
commission or the legislature?
These are only some of the questions that would need to be
addressed if the voters decided to revise the constitution and if
a regulatory ethics body was created in that revision.
VI. Conclusion
Whether the voters decide to revise New York’s Constitution
has been forcefully debated. There are good reasons for and
against revision. But one of the most compelling reasons for
revision is to adopt in a new constitution a strong ethics law.
Despite numerous ethics investigations, ethics legislation, and
criminal prosecutions of corruption, New York leads the nation
in the number of convictions of lawmakers for corruption. And
despite the passage of numerous ethics laws and the creation of
numerous ethics enforcement bodies, the state has not yet
demonstrated a serious commitment to meaningful ethics
reform. It may be, as this essay suggests, that the only effective
route to meaningful ethics reform is through a revised
constitution that incorporates strong ethics laws and a viable
78. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics
Commission – Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 97 (R.I. 1999) (Rhode Island
ethics commission exceeded its powers by promulgating regulations that
impinge on executive or legislative branch functions).
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mechanism for enforcement.
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